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Abstract: Due to the large size and complex structure of modern networks, firewall policies can
contain several thousand rules. The size and complexity of these policies require automated tools
providing a user-friendly environment to specify, configure and safely deploy a target policy. Much
research has already addressed policy specification, conflit detection, and optimization but very
little research is devoted to firewall policy deployment. Only recently, some researchers have pro-
posed deployment strategies for two important classes of policy editing languages. In this report, we
show that these strategies have serious flaws leading to security breaches. Then we provide correct,
efficient and safe algorithms for both classes of languages.Our experimental results show that these
algorithms are very fast and can be used safely even for deploying very large policies.
Key-words: Firewall Policy Management, Firewalls, Network Security.
∗ INRIA Nancy Grand Est, UMR 7503 (ahmedzee@loria.fr).
† INRIA Nancy Grand Est & Univ. Nancy 2, UMR 7503 (imine@loria.fr).
‡ INRIA Nancy Grand Est, UMR 7503 (rusi@loria.fr).
Stratégies Ŝures et Efficaces pour la Mise-̀a-jour des Politiques
de Pare-Feu
Résuḿe : Actuellement, les politiques de pare-feu (en anglais firewall) peuvent contenir de milliers
de règles et ce à cause de la taille énorme et la structure complexe des réseaux modernes. De ce
fait, ces politiques nécessitent des outils automatiquesfournissant un environnement convivial pour
spécifier, configurer et déployer en sûreté une politique cible. Beaucoup de travaux de recherche ont
traité de la spécification des politiques, la détection des conflits et le problème d’optimisation, mais
très peu de travaux se sont intéressés au déploiement depolitiques. Ce n’est que récemment, certains
chercheurs ont proposé des stratégies de déploiement pour les deux importantes catégories d’édition
de politiques. Dans ce rapport, nous montrons que ces strat´egies sont erronées et pourraient mener
à des failles de sécurité. Ensuite, nous fournissons deux algorithmes corrects, efficaces et sûrs pour
les classes d’édition de politiques. Nos résultats expérimentaux montrent que ces algorithmes sont
trés rapides et peuvent être utilisés en toute sûreté,même pour le déploiement de politiques dont la
taille est très importante.
Mots-clés : Gestion des Politiques de Pare-Feu, Pare-Feu, Sécurité des Réseaux.
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1 Introduction
A firewall is an essential component of any network security infrastructure. Network firewalls are
devices or systems that control the flow of traffic between networks employing different security
postures [18]. The network traffic flow is controlled according to a firewall policy.
The large size and complexity of modern networks result in large and complex firewall policies.
Firewall policies containing 10K rules are not uncommon andfirewalls configured with as many as
50K rules exist [24]. Due to intervening nature of firewall rues, correct configuration anddeploy-
mentof such large policies is a very difficult and error-prone. A policy deployment is the process by
which the running policy is replaced by the target policy.
To ease the burden on firewall administrators, many firewall mnagement tools such as Cisco Se-
curity Manager [2], Juniper Networks’ Netscreen Security Manager [6], and Check Point SmartCen-
ter [1] have been developed. These tools provide a user-friendly environment to specify, configure
and automatically deploy a target policy. Much research hasaddressed policy specification [10,7,16],
conflict detection [19, 15, 9], and optimization [20, 17]. However, very little research has been done
on firewall policy deployment.
A firewall policy deployment should have following characteristics [24]: correctness, confiden-
tiality, safety, and speed.
Correctness: A deployment is correct if it successfully implements the target policy on the firewall.
After a correct deployment the target policy becomes the running policy. Correctness is an essential
requirement for any deployment.
Confidentiality : Confidentiality refers to securing the communication between a management tool
and a firewall. Due to the sensitive nature of information transmitted during a deployment, the
communication between management tool and firewall should be confidential. Confidentiality can
be achieved by using encrypted communication protocols such as SSH [23] and SSL [22].
Safety: A deployment issafeif no legal packet is rejected and no illegal packet is accepted during
the deployment. A naive deployment strategy may result in self-D nial of Service (self-DoS) and/or
temporary security breaches. Deployment safety is a new andchallenging area of research.
Speed: A deployment should be done in the shortest time, so that thedesired state of affairs is
achieved as quickly as possible. A deployment algorithm should have a good running time, so that
it is applicable even for large policies. Also, the algorithm should be efficient i.e. it should issue the
minimum number of commands to accomplish the deployment. A slow deployment is unpleasant
for users and may partly defeat the purpose of deployment [24].
Different firewalls support different policy editing commands. The set of policy editing com-
mands that a firewall supports is called its policy editing language. In [24], the authors classify
policy editing languages into two representative classes,Type I and Type II, and provide deploy-
ment algorithms for both types of languages. To the best of our knowledge, it is the first work that
addresses deployment safety and efficiency.
In this paper, we analyse the algorithms provided in [24] andshow that these algorithms have
serious flaws. We present an improved safety formalization that can be used as a basis for formulat-
ing safe deployment strategies (Section 3). We provide two linear algorithms for Type I deployment
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(Section 4). The first algorithm is most-efficient and it ensure that either no legal traffic is rejected
or no illegal traffic is permitted. While the second algorithm is safe but it generates some extra
rules to ensure deployment safety. We also give an approximatively linear, most-efficient and safe
algorithm for Type II languages (Section 5). Finally, we present experimental results of our Type II
algorithm, and give conclusions.
2 Firewall Background
A firewall is a perimeter security device that filters packetsthat traverse across the boundaries of a
secured network. The filtering decision is based on a firewallpolicy defined by network administra-
tor. A firewall policy is an ordered list of rules. A firewall rule r defines an action, typically accept
or reject, for the set of packets matching its criteria. Majority of firewalls filter traffic according
to first-match semantics, that is when a packetp arrives, it is compared against the rules top-down
until a matching rule is found and the process is repeated forthe following packet. All policies have
a hidden match-all default rule at the end. Therefore, when apacket does not match a rule in the
policy, then the default action is followed. In most firewalls, the default rule isdeny-all, however
a permit-all default rule is also possible. Majority of firewalls do not allow identical rules in the
same policy.Therefore, we assume this restriction and do not allow duplication of rules within a
policy. A rule is a set of fields, where each field can have an atomic value or a range of values.
It is possible to use any field of IP, UDP, or TCP headers [24]. However, the following five fields
are most commonly used: protocol type, source IP address, source port, destination IP address and
destination port [12].
Any field in packet’s header can be used for the matching process. However, the same five fields
are most commonly used. In a packet, each of these fields has antomic value. If all the fields of
a packetp match with the corresponding fields of a ruler, thenp is accepted or rejected according
to the decision field ofr. If p does not match to any rule in policy, then the default match-all rule is
applied.
3 Policy Deployment
Policy deployment is the process by which policy editing commands are issued on firewall, so that
the target policy becomes the running policy. As discussed in the Introduction, a deployment must
be correct and should satisfy the following three characteristics: confidentiality, safety, and speed.
3.1 Policy Editing Languages
A network administrator or a management tool issues commands o firewall to transform the running
policy R into the target policyT. The set of commands that a firewall supports is called its policy
editing language. Typically, a firewall uses a subset of the following editing commands [24]:
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(app r) appends ruler at the end ofR
(del r) deletesr from R
(del i) deletes the rule at positioni from R
(ins i r) insertsr at positioni
(mov i j) moves theith rule to thejth position inR
Policy editing languages can be classified into two representative classes [24]: Type I and Type
II.
Type I Editing. Type I editing supports only two commands, append and delete. Command(app
r) appends a ruler at the end of the running policyR, unlessr is already inR, in which case the
command fails. Command( el r) deletesr from R, if it is present. As Type I editing can transform
any running policy into any target policy [24], therefore itis complete. Most older firewalls and
some recent firewalls,such as FWSM 2.x [2] and JUNOSe 7.x [6],only support Type I editing.
Type II Editing. Type II languages allow random editing of firewall policy. Itsupports three op-
erations:(ins i r) inserts ruler as theith rule in running policyR, unlessr is already present;(del
i) deletesith rule fromR; (mov i j) moves theith rule to the jth in R position. Type II editing can
transform any running policy into any target policy withoutaccepting illegal packets or rejecting le-
gal packets [24], therefore it is both complete and safe. It is obvious that for a given set of initial and
target policies, a Type II deployment normally uses fewer editing commands than an equivalent Type
I deployment. Examples of Type II editing firewalls include Sun creen 3.1 Lite [14] and Enterasys
Matrix X [3].
3.2 Deployment Efficiency
A deployment is most-efficient if it utilizes the minimum number of editing commands in a given
language, to correctly deploy a target policy on a firewall. Therefore for a given deployment scenario,
the most-efficient Type I deployment uses the minimum numberof append and delete commands,
similarly a most-efficient Type II deployment uses the minimu number of insert, delete and move
commands. Usually a policy editing command takes constant time, and the variation in deployment
time is negligible for different types of commands. Therefo, the most-efficient deployment min-
imizes the overall deployment time. Deployment efficiency for Type I and Type II languages are
discussed in more detail in Sections 4 and 5 respectively.
3.3 Deployment Safety
A deployment is safe if no security hole is introduced and no lega traffic is denied at any stage
during the deployment. A temporary security hole may permitmalicious traffic to pass through the
firewall that may cause serious damage to the network infrastructure. Similarly, rejection of legal
traffic during deployment may interrupt critical operations and result in serious losses. This is like
inflicting a self-DoS attack and hence it is intolerable in mission-critical networks, even for a short
duration of time.
Deployment safety is particulary important in cases where many changes are to be made to a
large firewall policy. In such cases, a deployment can last upto several minutes, which may provide
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sufficient opportunity to a malicious party to exploit a vulnerability. Fast spreading worms, such
as Conficker [5] and Slammer [4], can infect million of systems across the globe within minutes.
Furthermore, a skilled hacker can use automated tools to continuously probe for vulnerabilities and
instantly exploit these as they appear during an unsafe deployment.
The first serious work on deployment safety is presented in [24], and a safe deployment formal-
ization is presented. The formalization defines a safe deployment as follow; PolicyA is denial-safe
w.r.t. policiesB andC iff every packet thatA denies is also denied byB or C. A deployment is
denial-safe iff at every moment during the deployment the running policy is denial-safe w.r.t. to the
initial and the target policies. Similarly, policyA is permission-safew.r.t. policiesB andC iff every
packet thatA permits is also permitted byB or C. A deployment is permission-safe iff at every mo-
ment during the deployment the running policy is permission-safe w.r.t. to the initial and the target
policies. A policy issafeiff it is both denial-safe and permission-safe. In the rest of paper, we de-
note the initial policy byI and the target policy byT. A firewall has a new running policy every time
an editing command is applied. Thus deployment can be viewedas a sequence of running policies
I = R0,R1, ...,Ri−1,Rn = T with Ri+1 is derived by applying an editing command toRi [24].
Let P(x) denotes the set of packets permitted by Policy x and D(x) denotes the set of packets
denied by Policy x. Then, mathematically we can define that Policy x is safe w.r.t. policyI and
policy T as follows:
Sa f e(x, I,T)←→ (P(I)∩P(T))⊆ P(x)⊆ (P(I)∪P(T))
Sa f e(x, I,T)←→ (D(I)∩D(T))⊆ D(x)⊆ (D(I)∪D(T))
Definition 3.1 Partial-Safe Deployment.A deployment is partial-safe if it is either permission-safe
or denial-safe but not both w.r.t. initial and final policies.
Theorem 1 A deployment that satisfies the following two conditions is safe:
(a) Every running policyR only contains rules fromI andT, and every rule common to bothI andT
is present in R. (b) Let r1 and r2 be two rules inI or T or both, such that r2 always appears after r1,
then r2 appears after r1 in R.
Proof. The first condition states that a rule can appear inRonly if it belongs toI or T, and the rules
common to bothI andT are always present in R. The second condition states that wheneverr1 and
r2 simultaneously appear inR, the mutual order ofr1 andr2 in R is according to eitherI or T.
Let r be a rule that it is present in bothI andT, andp1 be a packet that hitsr in both policies.
Clearly, no ruler ′ exists beforer in I or T that matchesp1. According to condition(a),r is always
present in R. According to condition(b),r ′ cannot occur beforer. Thereforep1 will always hit r in
R. If p1 is permitted byr, thenp1 is always permitted during the deployment and vice versa. Let p2
be a packet that does not match any rule inI andT. According to condition (a), only rules fromI
andT can appear inR. Therefore,p2 will never hit a rule inR. Hence,R is safe w.r.t.I andT, and
the deployment is safe. 
Theorem 2 A deployment which only utilizes the rules ofI andT, and satisfies the condition(b) of
Theorem 1 is partial-safe.
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Proof. We first consider a firewall policy with a deny-all default rule at the end, i.e. all packets that
do not match to any rule are rejected by default. Let us consider a ruler1, which denies a packetp1,
is present in bothI andT. Let us consider a ruler2, which acceptsp1, is present in eitherI or T or
both. Assume thatp1 hits r1 in bothI andT. This implies that ifr2 appears inI or T, it appears after
r1. Now, if R contains only rules fromI andT and the condition(b) of Theorem 1 is satisfied then
r2 cannot appear before1 in R during the deployment. Therefore, ifr1 is present inR, thenp1 hits
r1 and it is denied. On the other hand, ifr1 is not present inR, thenr2 is also not present inRandp1
does not match any rule inR and it is denied by the default rule. Thus, any packet that is denied by
I andT is also denied byRand hence the deployment is safe.
Following the same reasoning, it can be proved that a firewallith a permit-all default rule is
denial-safe. 
4 Type I Deployment
4.1 Problems with Previous Algorithms
Two algorithms are presented in [24] for Type I deployment. It is assumed that both the initial policy
I and the final oneT are stored in separate arrays. The first deployment algorithm follows a simple
scheme but it is not most-efficient. The algorithm is comprised of two phases. In phase 1, starting
from the first rule inT, the algorithm appends each rule inT to the end ofR . If the rule is already
present inR, then it is first deleted the appended back at the end of R. In phase 2, starting from the
last rule inI, every rule inI that is not inT is deleted fromR. It is claimed in [24] that the deployment
is safe except for intervals when rules that are present in both I andT are deleted and appended back.
However, we have found that this algorithm is not safe for other situations as well.
I T
a. deny tcp 10.1.1.0/24 any b. permit ip 192.168.1.0/24 any
b. permit ip 192.168.1.0/24 any a. deny tcp 10.1.1.0/24 any
c. permit tcp 10.1.0.0/16 any c. permit tcp 10.1.0.0/16 any
d. permit tcp 192.168.2.0/24 any d. permit tcp 192.168.2.0/24
(a) Initial and Target policies.
R
c. permit tcp 10.1.0.0/16 any
d. permit tcp 192.168.2.0/24 any
b. permit ip 192.168.1.0/24 any
a. deny tcp 10.1.1.0/24 any
(b) Running policy.
Figure 1: Example of Policy Deployment
For example, consider the initial and target policies givenin Figure 1.(a). Now consider a packet
p with source address of 10.1.1.1. Clearly, rulea deniesp, while rulec accepts it. It is evident that
both I andT denyp. If we apply the algorithm,then after two steps we get the resulting running
policy Ras shown in Figure 1.(b).
Now rule c appears before rulea, while it appears aftera in both I andT. The running policy
acceptsp, which is denied by bothI andT. Clearly, the condition(b) of Theorem 1 is violated and
R is not safe w.r.t.I andT. Hence, the deployment by the given algorithm is not safe even when
common rules are appended back toR.
The second algorithm proposed for Type I editing in [24] is called SCANNINGDEPLOYMENT .
It is claimed that this algorithm is a most efficient Type I algorithm. However, it can be easily shown
INRIA
Safe and Efficient Strategies for Updating Firewall Policies 9
that the algorithm is not correct even in simple cases. When tis algorithm is used for deployment,
the longest prefix ofT that is a subsequence ofI is deleted from the final running policy i.e.T is
not deployed correctly. For example, consider the by applying SCANNINGDEPLOYMENT on I and
T with the same rules as in Figure 1.(a) we have:
I T
a b
b c
c d
−→ SCANNINGDEPLOYMENT−→
R
d
Clearly, the deployment is not correct. Also, the rulesb andc that are present in bothI andT are
missing fromR, and the condition(a) of Theorem 1 is not satisfied. Considera packetp2 with source
address 192.168.1.1. Clearly,p2 is permitted by bothI andT, butRdenies it. This a serious problem
because the final running policy will deny legal traffic untila future deployment is done correctly.
SCANNINGDEPLOYMENT comprises of two phases. In the first phase, a stack and a hash table is
used to store all the rules that are candidates of being deleted in the next phase. At the end of Phase
I, the hash table should contain only hashes of rules that arenot present inT. In the second phase,
the algorithm pops a rule from stack and check if it is in hash table. If it is present in hash table that
means it is inI but notT and should be deleted. However, the algorithm is not formulated correctly
and at the end of phase I, hash table contain entries for rulesin T. As a consequence, these rules are
deleted from the final running policy andT is not deployed correctly.
4.2 Our Solutions for Type I Deployment
Algorithm 1 presents the corrected version of SCANNINGDEPLOYMENT, in which the rules inT are
deleted from the hash table at the end of phase I. These correcti ns are shown in bold (lines 19-23).
Recall that two types of security problems may arise during aunsafe deployment: (a) Rejection of
legal traffic. (b) Creation of temporary security holes.
To be safe, a firewall policy deployment must avoid both typesof problems. However, safe de-
ployment is not always possible by using only the rules ofI andT and Type I editing commands [24].
In Algorithm 2, called PARTIAL SAFEDEPLOYMENT, we give a most-efficient algorithm that pro-
vides apartial-safedeployment, that is it can avoid either situation (a) or (b) but not both. For
firewall policies with permit-all semantics, the algorithmensures that situation (a) will never occur.
Similarly, for firewall policies with deny-all semantics situation (b) is avoided.
It is worth mentioning that some types of security threats cannot be dealt by firewalls alone and
additional security mechanism such as Intrusion Detectionand Prevention System (IDPS) [8] may
be required. If the situation (b) temporarily arises duringa deployment, an IDPS can be configured
to block the illegal packets that may pass through the firewall. Therefore, in the presence of an IDPS,
a firewall policy with permit-all semantics can avoid both types of problem.
The algorithm is efficient, as it deploys the target policy using the minimum number of Type I
editing commands. The algorithm selectively deletes all rules that are inI but not inT, in reverse
order and appropriately append rules toR. The algorithm begins by finding the longest prefixT ′ of T
that is a subsequence ofI and all rules ofI that are not inT ′, starting from first rule inI, are pushed
RR n° 6940
10 Z. Ahmed, A. Imine and M. Rusinowitch
to stack and added to hash table (lines 3-9). Next, starting from the first rule inT that is not inT ′,
each ruler is taken and placed at correct position inR. If r is present in hash table, this implies thatr
is present inRand needs to be deleted first. If In this case, all rules inI that are not inT ′ and occurs
afterr in I are deleted fromR (lines 12-17). Thenr is deleted fromR and appended back at the end.
This ensures that all rules, which do not appear beforer in I or T, never appear before r in R. Thus,
the condition of Theorem 2 is satisfied and the algorithm PARTIAL SAFEDEPLOYMENT is partial-
safe. Finally, the stack contains rules that are inI but notT and therefore must be deleted from R.
After the deletion of these rules (lines 20-21),R becomesT. Hence, the deployment is also correct.
Let |X| represents the total number of rules in policy X , then|I |+ |T|−2|T′| editing commands are
generated by the algorithm. The algorithm takes O(n) time and space,wheren = max(|I |, |T|).
1: CORRECTSCANNINGDEPLOYMENT(I ,T )
2: // Phase I:
3: i← 1
4: for t← 1 to sizeOf(T) do
5: while i ≤ sizeOf(I ) andI [i] 6= T[t] do
6: stack.push (I [i])
7: hash.add (I [i])
8: i← i +1
9: end while
10: if i > sizeOf(I ) then
11: if hash.contains(T[t]) then
12: hash.remove (T[t])
13: IssueCommand (delT[t])
14: end if
15: IssueCommand (appT[t])
16: end if
17: end for
18: // Phase II:
19: for t← 1 to sizeOf(T) do
20: if hash.contains(T[t]) then
21: hash.remove (T[t])
22: end if
23: end for
24: if sizeOf(I ) ≥ sizeof(T) and sizeOf(T)> 0 then
25: i← i +1
26: end if
27: for j ← sizeOf(I ) downtoi do
28: IssueCommand (delI [ j])
29: end for
30: while NOT stack.emptydo
31: r ← stack.pop()
32: if hash.contains(r)then
33: IssueCommand (del r)
34: end if
35: end while
Algorithm 1: Corrected version for Scan-
ning Deployment proposed by [24].
1: PARTAIL SAFEDEPLOYMENT(I ,T )
2: // Find longest prefixT ′ of T such thatT ′ ⊆ I
3: j← 1
4: for i← 1 to sizeOf(I ) do
5: if I [i] = T[ j] then
6: j← j +1
7: else
8: stack.push(I [i])
9: hash.add (I [i])
10: end if
11: end for
12: // Place each rule ofT that is not inT ′ at correct position
13: for t← j to sizeOf(T) do
14: if hash.contains(T[t]) then
15: repeat
16: y← stack.pop()
17: IssueCommand (del y)
18: hash.delete(y)
19: until y = T[t]
20: end if
21: IssueCommand (appT[i])
22: end for
23: // Delete all rules inI that are not inT
24: while NOT stack.emptydo
25: IssueCommand (del stack.pop())
26: end while
Algorithm 2: Partial Safe Deployment.
Due to the limited set of operations and the restriction thatrepetition of rules is not allowed,
not all deployments can be done safely using Type I languages[24]. The restriction, that all rules
must be distinct, can be overcome by using semantically equivalent rules or by breaking a ruler
into sub-rulesr1 and r2, such thatr1 ∪ r2 = r. Two rulesr1 and r2 are considered semantically
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equivalent, if both rules match exactly the same set of packets. The union,r1∪ r2, provides the
semantic equivalence tor. Regardless of firewall policy architecture, it is always possible to split
a rule with a multi-value field into several rules [21]. In Algorithm 3, we provide a safe strategy
for Type I deployment by splittingr into r1 andr2. An obvious scheme to splitr into semantically
equivalent rules is to to find the first fieldf in r that can be split into fieldsf1 and f2, then generate
two rulesr1 andr2 such that:
r1. f = f1, r2. f = f2, andr1. f ∪ r2. f = r. f
All other fields ofr1 andr2 remains identical to the corresponding fields ofr.
The algorithm begins by finding the longest prefixT ′ of T that is a subsequence ofI. Then, for
each ruler in T that needs to be deleted fromR and appended back later on, two rulesr1 and r2
are appended first toR, thenr is deleted fromR and appended back at the end ofR. Finally, r1, r2
and all rules inI that are not inT are deleted fromR. The algorithm follows the same logic as in
PARTIAL SAFEDEPLOYMENT (see Algorithm 2), except that before deleting a common rulef om R,
semantically equivalent rules are appended toR. Thus, both conditions of Theorem 1 are satisfied,
and the deployment is safe. The algorithm has a linear running time, but it cannot be considered
most-efficient because it generates two extra rules for eachrule r common to bothI andT such thatr
is not inT ′. However, the deployment is safe at each step, and at the endT is deployed correctly. Let
c1 represents the number of rules inI but notT, andc2 represents the number of rules inT but not
not I, then the total number of commands generated by algorithm isequal to 6|I |+c2−6|T′|−5c1.
5 Type II Deployment
Type II deployment allows for random modification of a running policy. Therefore, for a given set
of I andT, a safe Type II deployment usually utilizes less editing commands than an equivalent Type
I deployment. IfI andT have identical set of rules, thenT can be considered as a permutation of
I. In this case, the optimal edit sequence preserves a LongestCommon Subsequence LCS(I,T) of
the two sequences, and the optimal edit sequence have lengthqual to|I |− |LCS(I ,T)| [13]. That
is, a move command has to be generated for each rule that is notn LCS(I,T). In the general case,
whereI has some rules that are not inT andT has some rules that are not inI, a command has to be
generated to insert/delete each such rule. Therefore, the optimal edit sequence will have a length of
|I |+ |T|−c−|LCS(I ,T)|, wherec is the number of rules common to bothI andT.
5.1 Problems with Previous Algorithms
Two algorithms are proposed in [24] for type II deployment. The first algorithm is a greedy two-
phase algorithm called TWOPHASEDEPLOYMENT, while the second algorithm is a most-efficient
algorithm called SANITIZE IT. It is claimed in [24] that TWOPHASEDEPLOYMENT is correct and
safe. However, it can be shown that it is not correct even for very simple deployments. Consider the
application of TWOPHASEDEPLOYMENT to I andT given in Figure 1.(a):
I T
a c
b b
c a
−→ TWOPHASEDEPLOYMENT−→
R
a
c
b
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1: SAFET1DEPLOYMENT(I ,T )
2: // U holds the original rules that are broken and need to be appended back later on
3: // V holds the rulesr1 andr2 that are to be deleted later on
4: i← 1
5: j← 1
6: isStarted← FALSE
7: for i← 1 to sizeOf(T) do
8: while i ≤ sizeOf(I ) andI [i] 6= T[t] do
9: stack.push(I [i])
10: hash.add(I [i])
11: i← i +1
12: end while
13: if i ≤ sizeOf(I ) then
14: i← i +1
15: else
16: if NOT isStartedthen
17: if hash.contains(T[t]) then
18: isStarted← TRUE
19: r ← T[t]
20: U.append(r)
21: // Split rule r into sub-rulesr1 andr2
22: V.append(r1)
23: V.append(r2)
24: IssueCommand (appr1)
25: IssueCommand (appr2)
26: else
27: IssueCommand (appr)
28: end if
29: else
30: r ← T[t]
31: U.append(r)
32: // Split rule r into sub-rulesr1 andr2
33: V.append(r1)
34: V.append(r2)
35: IssueCommand (appr1)
36: IssueCommand (appr2)
37: end if
38: end if
39: end for
40: // Phase II
41: while NOT stack.emptydo
42: r ← stack.pop()
43: if hash.contains(r)then
44: IssueCommand (delr)
45: end if
46: end while
47: for i← 1 to sizeOf(U ) do
48: IssueCommand(appU [i])
49: end for
50: for j← sizeOf(V) downTo 1do
51: IssueCommand (delV[ j])
52: end for
Algorithm 3: Safe Type I Deployment.
Obviously, the final running policy is different fromT, and hence the deployment is not correct.
This a serious problem because the final running policy will remain unsafe until a future deployment
is done correctly. SANITIZE IT is a most-efficient and safe Type II algorithm that depends upon the
optimal edit sequence D computed bydiff algorithm [24]. The deployment sequence D is given as
an input to SANITIZE IT. An important question is how to compute the set of rules∆ from D. The
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diff algorithm generates a sequence ofinsanddelcommands, and the rule’s position specified in an
operation depends upon the sequence of previous operations. Therefore, it is not clear that how to
directly determine the rule concerned by a particular operation. This computation might change the
overall complexity of the algorithm. For example, considerthe following running policy and the set
of insert and delete operations performed on it.
R del 3 ins 1,c ins 3,d del 4
a a c c c
b b a a a
c b d d
b
The sequence of rules concerned by these operations is (c,d,b). But to actually determine the
rule concerned by a particular operation, one must know the current state of R.
5.2 Our Solution for Type II Deployment
The above problems motivate us to provide a correct, safe andmost-efficient O(n log n) algorithm,
called EFFICIENTDEPLOYMENT (see Algorithms 4 and 5). The main phases in EFFICIENTDEPLOY-
MENT can be summarized as follow:
1. Construction of Intermediate Target policyT2
2. Perform Move up and Insert operations
3. Perform Move Down and Delete operations
The algorithm performs a most-efficient deployment by generating exactly one editing command
for each rule inI andT that is not in the longest common sequence ofI andT LCS(I,T), represented
by L in the Algorithm. Computation of LCS is a classical problem that can be solved inO(nlogn)
time [11]. Letr be a rule that is present in bothI andT but notL, andr ′ be the first rule ofL that
appears afterr in T, then whether is to be moved up or moved down can be determined as follows:
if (IndexO f(r ′, I) < IndexO f(r, I)) then (Move Upr) else(Move Downr) end if
In the first phase (lines 3-27), the algorithm constructs an intermediate target policyT2 such that
every rule to be moved up or inserted inR is placed correctly relative to the elements ofL, while the
rules to be moved down or deleted fromR preserve their relative position inI w.r.t elements ofL.
As the order of rules to be deleted or moved down is preserved between the initial policyI andT2,
therefore LCS(I,T2) consists of all the rules inL, the rules to be moved down and the rules that are
in I but not inT. Similarly, LCS(T2,T) consists of all the rules inL, the rules to be moved up and the
rules that are inT but not inI. LCS(I ,T2) is represented byL2, while LCS(T2,T) is represented by
L3 in the algorithm. The role ofT2 is to simplify the calculation of rules’ positions as the commands
are issued over the running policy.
The construction ofT2 is very simple, and is done as follows. A pointercpI is maintained inI,
that represent points to current rule inI that is a candidate to be appended toT2. Starting from first
rule in T, any rules to be moved up or inserted are appended toT2. If a rule r ′ that is inL is found,
thenI is traversed from current pointer untilr ′ is found and all rules that are not inT2 are appended
to T2. Also, all rules inI that are to be moved down or deleted are pushed into a stack. This phase
takes O(n) time and space, wheren≤ |I |+ |T|.
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1: EFFICIENTDEPLOYMENT(I ,T )
2: // Phase I: Construction ofT2
3: S1← empty stack ,L← LCS(I ,T)
4: r ′← L. f irst , cpI← 1
5: for t← 1 to sizeOf(T) do
6: if T[t] = r ′ then
7: while I [cpI] 6= T[t] do
8: if I [cpI] /∈ T2 then
9: T2.append(I [cpI]) , L2.append(I [cpI])
10: end if
11: if I [cpI] /∈ T then
12: S1.push(I [cpI])
13: end if
14: cpI← cpI+1
15: end while
16: T2.append(r ′) , L2.append(r ′)
17: r ′← L.next
18: else
19: if T[t] /∈ I then
20: T2.append(T[t])
21: else
22: if indexOf(T[t], I) > indexO f(r ′, I) AND indexO f(r ′,T)≤ sizeO f(I) then
23: T2.append(T[t])
24: else
25: S1.push(T[t])
26: end if
27: end if
28: end if
29: for i← cpI to sizeOf(I ) do
30: if I [i] /∈ T2 then
31: S1.push(I [i])
32: end if
33: end for
34: end for
35: // Phase II: Move up and Insert operations
36: r ′← L2. f irst , inserts← 0 , cursor← indexO f(r ′, I)
37: for t← 1 to sizeOf(T2) do
38: if T2 = r ′ then
39: indexO f(r ′,R)← indexO f(r ′, I)+ inserts+Moveups(r ′,FALSE)
40: L3.append(r ′)
41: if NOT L2.endthen
42: r ′← L2.next
43: curosr← indexO f(r ′, I)+ inserts+Moveups(r ′,FALSE)
44: else
45: cursor← cursor+1
46: end if
47: else
48: if T2[t] /∈ I then
49: IssueCommand (ins cursor,T2[t])
50: inserts← inserts+1 , cursor← cursor+1, L3.append(T2[t])
51: else
52: if indexOf(T2[t], I) > indexO f(r ′, I) then
53: IssueCommand (movindexO f(T2[t], I)+MoveU ps(T2[t],TRUE)+ inserts, cursor)
54: cursor← cursor+1 , L3.append(T2[t]
55: end if
56: end if
57: end if
58: end for
59: //Phase III: Move Down and Delete operations
60: while NOT S1.emptydo
61: r ← S1.pop()
62: if r /∈ T then
63: r.pos← indexO f(r,T2)+1
64: D.append(r)
65: else
66: r ′← L3.next
67: cursor← indexO f(r ′,T2)−MoveDowns(l ,FALSE)+1
68: r.pos← indexOf(r,T2) - MoveDowns(r,TRUE)
69: IssueCommand (move r.pos, cursor)
70: end if
71: end while
72: for d← 1 to sizeOf(D)do
73: r ← D[d]
74: IssueCommand (del r.pos)
75: end for
Algorithm 4: Efficient Type II Deployment.
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1: MoveUps(r, add)
2: /* The fucntion MoveUps takes two argumentsr andadd. The function returns the number of rules N, which are already moved up, having
initial position below the initial position ofr . If add=TRUE, then r is added to the list M for future rule comparison, therwise it is not
added to the array M. The value of N is determined using Binarysearch */
3: start← 1 , last← sizeO f(T2) , count← 0
4: i← (start+ last)÷2 // Integer Division
5: while i 6= indexO f(r,T2) do
6: if i < indexO f(r,T2) then
7: if add= TRUEthen
8: M[i]←M[i]+1
9: end if
10: start← i +1
11: else
12: count← count+M[i]
13: last← i−1
14: end if
15: i← (start+ last)÷2
16: end while
17: if add= TRUE then
18: M[i]←M[i]+1
19: else
20: count← count+M[i]
21: end if
22: return count
23:
24:
25: MoveDowns(r, add)
26: // Same as MoveUps, except that statements 8 and 12 are interchanged.
Algorithm 5: MoveUps and MoveDowns Functions.
In the next phase,T2 is considered as the target policy. All the rules to be inserted or moved up
are placed at their correct position according toT2 (lines 30-48). After the completion of this phase,
T2 becomes the running policy. Starting from first rule inT2, the algorithm traversesT2 and perform
move up and insert operations. As a ruler is encountered inT2, its current position inR is computed
and updated by using the following relation:
Current Position of r in R← r’s position inI + M + N
where, M is the number of rules already inserted inR and N is the number of rules that are
already moved up that initially appear belowr in I. The value of N is determined in log|T| steps
in the functionMoveUps(lines 67-84). All rules inL, and the rules moved up or inserted to R are
placed inL3.
In the last phaseT2 is converted toT (lines 51-63). Editing commands are generated for rules to
be moved down or deleted fromRand the current position of each ruler is determined and updated
using the following equation:
Current Position of r in R← r’s position inT2 - U
where U is the number of rules already moved down having initial position above the initial
position ofr. The value of U is determined in log|T| steps in a way similar to M except that counts
are maintained for rules that are already moved down. Phase II nd III takes O(klogk) time in total,
where k is equal to|T2|− |LCS(I ,T)|
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5.3 Safety and Correctness ofEFFICIENTDEPLOYMENT
It can be shown that EFFICIENTDEPLOYMENT is both safe and correct. Firstly, we show thatT2 is
safe w.r.t.I andT. Starting from the first rule inT, any rule to be inserted or moved up is immediately
appended at the end ofT2. Once a ruler is appended toT2, no other rule can be placed beforer in T2.
This means that the order of rules to be moved up or inserted isaccording toT. When a ruler ′ of L is
encountered inT, thenI is traversed untilr ′ is found inI, and all rules to be moved down or deleted
are appended toT2. Again, once a rule to be moved down or deleted is appended toT2, no rule can be
appended before it. Thus, the order of rules to be moved down or deleted is according to the order in
I. Hence, the condition (b) of Theorem 1 is satisfied. Also, it is evident that theT2 = I ∪T, therefore
the condition (a) of Theorem 1 is also satisfied andT2 is safe w.r.t.I andT.
In Phase II,T2 is traversed from the start and editing commands are generated for rules to be
moved up or inserted inR. As these rules follows the order ofT, this implies that a rule inT that is to
be moved up or inserted is placed correctly before any rules that appear after it inT. Similarly, in the
Phase III, editing commands are generated for all the elements to be moved down or deleted from
R. This phase perform operation in reverse order, that is a rule that appear towards the end ofT2 is
placed correctly before any rules that appear before it. Thus, at any moment during the deployment,
the rules in R follows the order inI or T. Hence, the condition (b) of Theorem 1 is satisfied.
Initially, R is equal toI. During phase II, all the rules inT that are not inI are inserted inR and
no rule is deleted fromR. This means that at the end of Phase I,R is equal toI ∪T and condition(a)
of Theorem 1 is satisfied. In Phase III, all rules that are inI but not inT are deleted fromR and no
new rule is inserted inR. Thus, at the end of phase III,R contains only rule inT and the ordering of
rule is exactly the same as inT as described in the previous paragraph. Therefore,RbecomesT and
the first condition(a) of Theorem 1 is also satisfied. Hence, th deployment is correct and safe.
6 Performance Evaluation
To evaluate the performance of EFFICIENTDEPLOYMENT, we try to follow the same set of test cases
as in [24]. We use four firewall policies with 2000, 5000, 1000, and 25000 rules. For each policy,
we perform five different tests. In a most-efficient deployment t st 1, test 2, test 3,test 4 and test 5
requires 10, 500, 1000, 60%, and 90% of commands respectively to convert initial policy to the target
policy. Note that these percentages are taken from the initial policy. The algorithm is implemented
in C++, and all tests are performed onDell Precision 370with Intel Pentium IV 2.0 Ghz processor
and 1 GB of RAM. The results of each test on policies 1-4 are givn n the table below. The time
taken by EFFICIENTDEPLOYMENT is specified in the column ED, while the column SI specifies the
total time taken bydiff and SANITIZE IT algorithm given in [24] for computing a safe deployment.
All times are represented in seconds.
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Tests Policy 1 (2,000) Policy 2 (5,000) Policy 3 (10,000) Policy 4 (25,000)
ED SI ED SI ED SI ED SI
Test 1 .00783 .01200 .01646 .02300 .03585 .04400 .08027 .24200
Test 2 .00704 .01200 .01813 .02800 .04721 .04900 .08116 .28300
Test 3 .00684 .03800 .01859 .04900 .03826 .07000 .08409 .32500
Test 4 .00684 .04000 .01837 .20500 .03713 1.3820 .08247 12.582
Test 5 .00696 .07000 .01687 .38700 .03454 4.3920 .08761 26.983
It is clear that EFFICIENTDEPLOYMENT takes a fraction of second to calculate safe and most-
efficient deployment for policies as large as Policy 4. Also,EFFICIENTDEPLOYMENT generates a
most-efficient and safe deployment much faster than the SanitizeIt algorithm. However, as no details
are given about nature of changes in [24], it might not be appro riate to directly draw conclusion
for tests 2-5. For example, consider Test 5 on Policy 4, 90% edit distance means 22500 commands
need to be issued to turnI to T. If 22,500 insert commands are required that meansT has 47,500
rules, while if 22,500 delete commands are required thenT has only 2500 rules. Therefore, reliable
comparison can only be done if size ofI andT used in [1] is known, so that policies of same size
could be used for testing EFFICIENTDEPLOYMENT. However, Test 1 involves only 10 changes and
it can be used to compare the two algorithms.
Figure 2: Comparison of EFFICIENTDEPLOYMENT and SanitizeIT for Test 1
From the curve illustrated in Figure 2, it can be concluded that EFFICIENTDEPLOYMENT is more
efficient than SANITIZE IT and the running time is close to linear. Furthermore, SANITIZE IT appears
to have a polynomial running time. This effect is more notable in case of test 5 and Policy 4, where
SI takes almost 27 secs to compute a deployment sequence.
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7 Conclusion
Firewall policy deployment safety is a new and area of research. In this paper, we have shown that
recent approaches [24]to firewall policy deployment contain cr tical errors. Indeed, these approaches
can introduce temporary security holes that permit illegaltr ffic and/or interrupt network services
by blocking legal traffic during a deployment. We have proposed a formalization for deployment
safety and used this formalization as a basis to provide safeand efficient algorithms for both Type I
and Type II languages. We have proposed for type I policy editing languages two correct algorithms:
the first one is efficient and partial-safe. The second one is safe but it is less-efficient as it generates
some extra rules in order to ensure safety. For Type II policyediting languages, we have presented
an approximatively linear, most-efficient and safe algorithm. Our experimental results showed that
this algorithm does not add any overhead and it is practical even for very large policies.
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